





Spatial Dimensions of Trade Liberalization 
















Abstract: This paper studies the spatial dimension of growth in Mexico 
over the last three decades. The literature regional economic growth has 
shown a decrease regional dispersion from 1970 to 1985 and as sharp 
increase afterwards coinciding with the trade liberalization of the 
Mexican economy. Using spatial econometric tools we analyze how the 
process of convergence/divergence has mapped spatially and whether it 
makes sense to talk about spatial regions in Mexico. Although the rich 
North/ poor South dichotomy has, overall, dominated this phenomenon, 
interesting patterns emerge. Namely that the distribution of growth after 
Mexico’s post liberalization seems to be much less associated to 
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The 17 years beginning with Mexico’s dramatic unilateral trade liberalization in 1985 
and including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have seen increasing 
divergence of per capita incomes among Mexican states. Measures of sigma convergence 
show a decrease in dispersion from 1970 to 1985, and then a sharp reversion to traditional 
levels of inequality thereafter. A growing number of studies using traditional beta 
convergence analysis,
1 find at minimum a slowdown of convergence, and most divergence 
(Juan-Ramon and Rivera Batiz 1996, Esquivel 1999, Messmacher 2000, Cermeño 2001, 
Esquivel and Messmacher 2002, Chiquiar, forthcoming). Of emerging concern is that this 
divergence is manifested in particular geographical patterns that will compound traditional 
inequalities: the northern states will take most advantage of free trade and rapidly converge 
to US income levels while those further south will continue their historical lag, polarizing the 
country.  However, neither the links from trade liberalization to the spatial location of 
economic activity, nor to economic convergence are well understood, theoretically or in the 
particular case of Mexico.  This paper employs established tools in the spatial economics 
literature to investigate both.   
 
 Background 
Mexico in 1985 began a process of unilateral liberalization shifted from an inward 
looking policy of import substitution to a policy of trade liberalization that included a 
dramatic reduction of import licensing covering 90% domestic production to 23% by 1988, a 
reduction of average levels of tariffs from 24% to 11%, and joining the general agreement on 
tariffs and trade (GATT) in 1986.  The pursuit of NAFTA, signed in 1994 would lead to a 
further reduction of tariffs to 1.3% by 2001, the progressive liberalization of sensitive 
sectors, as well as increased access to the US market and, it was hoped, a greater confidence 
that the reforms would be locked in and hence make foreign direct investment more 
attractive.
2   
 
                                                 
1 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995 
2 See Lustig, Bosworth and Lawrence (1992) and Lederman, Maloney and Serven (2005).   2
Much of the work analyzing the impacts of reform, and that predicting the impact of 
NAFTA looked at the impact on the output or exports of specific industries, but was silent on 
how their location might be affected.
3  However, the New Economic Geography (Krugman 
1991), building on the interplay of agglomeration externalities of industry due to the 
availability of specialized labor or intermediate inputs and technology spillovers on the one 
hand, and transportation costs on the other, offered some tools to examine the question.  In 
one possible scenario suggested by Hanson (1997), Mexico’s traditional inward looking 
policies led industry to locate near concentrations of industry and population in central 
Mexico City and serve the peripheral regions- the south and the north, from this base.   
However, the progressive liberalization of trade with the US,  arguably made locating nearer 
the US market more profitable shifting the center of gravity of the Mexican economy to the 
North, potentially in a dramatic fashion.  The benefits of proximity to the border would likely 
dissipate with distance and, as some have argued, lead to an increased dispersion of welfare 
between north and south (See Nicita 2005).   
However, such a dramatic shift accompanied by increased polarization with trade 
liberalization is not a foregone conclusion. To begin, theory remains ambiguous. As an 
example, Behrens et al. (2003) suggest that the finding of increased polarization with trade 
liberalization depends critically on the specific modeling of transport costs.
4  Second, both 
Krugman and others (see also Head and Mayer 2003 for a review) have noted the remarkable 
persistence of patterns of industry distribution over very long periods of time and large 
changes in economic environment. This may arise from the power of accumulated 
agglomeration externalities sparked initially by often trivial historical accident in Krugman’s 
view, or perhaps, the importance after all of natural advantages that anchor industries to their 
existing locales.  Davis et. al.(1997) argue that Heckscher Ohlin Vanek performs surprisingly 
well as a theory of the location of production in Japanese regions to the degree that they 
argue that Krugman-style geography models add little. Ellison and Glaeser (1999) find that 
only 21% of US industries exhibit levels of geographical concentration significantly higher 
than those predicted by natural advantages such as weather or natural resources.  Redding 
and Vera Martin (2005) show that both theoretically and in 45 regions of Europe, factor 
                                                 
3See for example, Maloney and Azevedo (1995) and Lustig, Bosworth and Lawrence (1992)  Lawrence 
specifically acknowledges the lack of reference to spatial considerations.  p. 65. 
4 In fact, Hanson’s paper argued that the emergence of a second pole would lead to compression of the wage 
distribution rather than divergence.   3
endowments are important in determining the location of production.
5  In either the NEG or 
HOV based views,  it is not clear whether the sudden increase in demand from abroad, and 
an increase in supply of cheaper and better quality inputs, may lead to the displacement of 
existing non-border growth poles, or their re-energizing.  Both scenarios are consistent with 
very localized and isolated hot spots, or large multi-state agglomerations distributed with no 
particular relation to the border.   
In Mexico, these types of considerations suggest that the emerging geographical 
patterns of economic performance may be more subtle and hard to predict. It is possible to 
imagine that the increased costs of exporting from established central industrial locales such 
as Queretaro, Aguascalientes, or Guadalajara might be offset by their well trained workforces 
and lower levels of congestion.
6  Domestic and potential foreign firms in these areas serving 
the Mexican market may be further energized by the increased access to cheaper and higher 
quality inputs from abroad and the lowered risk implied by, especially, the NAFTA 
agreement.
7 Further, the location of some potential growth industries is clearly driven by 
immobile endowments not necessarily concentrated on the border.  Esquivel (2000) finds that 
two-thirds of differences in Mexican state income is driven by natural characteristics 
(climate, vegetation).
8 NAFTA potentially has a stimulative impact on non-border areas with 
natural endowments when it eliminated import restrictions to the US on mangos (produced in 
Guerrero, Michoacan), pineapples (Veracruz, Oaxaca, Tabasco), and grapes in 1994 and asit 
phases out restrictions on tomatoes (Jalisco) and avocados (Michoacan) by 2008.
9  Both  
agricultural production and exports made large gains in the post-NAFTA period.
10  
REWRITE 
Further, other forms of non-road transport may offer low cost transport to the US 
market for non-border regions.  The two largest airports after Mexico City, are found in 
                                                 
5 Theoretically they show this should be the case regardless of the degree of factor mobility. Working in a 
similar tradition, Bernstein and Weinstein (2002) reintroduce the importance of  transport costs as a means of 
anchoring the indeterminacy intrinsic to HOV when the number of goods exceeds the number of factors.   
6 See Hanson (2001) for a discussion of the offsetting impacts of economies of agglomeration and diseconomies 
of congestion.  
7 See Lustig (1992) for a discussion of the latter point that NAFTA was significantly about signaling to foreign 
investors that the country was locking in the rules of the game.  
8 See Gallup, Gaviria and Lora (2003) for and english summary of Esquivel’s findings. 
9 No attempt is made to be comprehensive here, merely to show that these central and southern states cultivate 
these crops, some almost exclusively, and hence were likely to benefit from NAFTA. 
10 See Lederman, Maloney and Serven for a discussion of the resilience of Mexican agriculture.   4
Jalisco (center-south) and Yucatan (South). Airlift capacity, along with its high level of 
human capital, good governance, was critical to Intel’s plant location in south-of-Mexico 
Costa Rica and is important to the long established computer industry in Guadalajara, 
Jalisco.
11  Yucatan also benefits from the shallow water port of Progreso that offers easy 
access to US ports in the Gulf of Mexico as well as those in Central and South America and 
the Caribbean. It is perhaps not surprising that in 2003, Yucatan had the second highest 
concentration of maquila employment of a non-border state exceeded only by Jalisco. The 
port of Veracruz, the entry point for Mexico’s first globalizing influence in the 16
th century, 
remains Mexico's most important with extensive road and rail networks that connects the 
central and southern states, again to the Gulf of Mexico ports. Given this ready water access, 
all other endowment equal, a southern pole or a southeastern corridor enjoying the same 
benefits of proximity would seem as plausible than the region being left behind. 
In fact, to date, there is very little evidence that either the 1985 unilateral trade 
liberalization, or NAFTA has led to a correlation of growth with distance from the border.     
At the wage level, Hanson (1997) himself did not find that the North-South wage gradient 
steepened after 1985.  Using state per capita income data, Rodriguez-Pose and Sanchez-
Reaza (2005) find no relationship at any time period and our background regressions confirm 
this.
12  Esquivel (2000) finds no relationship of distance with either level of income or 
growth.  Chiquiar (forthcoming) finds a relationship of changes in growth with distance, but 
this appears to be a result very particular to the 1970-1985/1985-1999 difference that does 
not survive breaking the period into a post GATT (1985-1993) and post NAFTA periods 
1993-2002.
13 In sum, the geographical patterns of growth with liberalization are likely to be 
richer than at first thought.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Rodriguez-Clare(2001) notes Costa Rica’s better infrastructure in this area gave it the edge over Chile.   
12 Running a simple convergence regression for 1970-2002, 1970-1985, and 1985-2002, we find that distance 
never enters remotely significantly.  Putting in regional dummies suggests that the Chiapas-Oaxaca-Guerrero 
region did unusually poorly relative to other regions both in 1970-1985 and 1985-2002. Results available on 
request.   
13 Nicita (2004) ex post simulations find that gains in household welfare from trade liberalization were 
distributed broadly along a gradient from the North.  However, the core estimations driving the simulations, the 
pass through of tariffs to prices, imposes a linear distance from the border interactive term that, in turn, implies 
that the predicted values used in the simulations will show the same gradient pattern.  To be convincing, we 
would want to use the actual decline in prices in each state during liberalization.    5
Exploring Space 
Sigma, and Beta convergence approaches offer point estimates of the central tendency 
of the data toward convergence or divergence. However, as Quah (1993) notes, they obscure 
vast amounts of information on the dynamics of relative income movements among states 
and do not shed light on the spatial dimensions of growth.  As an example, simple plots of 
the distribution of income levels and growth rates (available on request) confirm Juan Ramon 
and Rivera-Batiz (1996) findings of a concentration of both in the period 1970-80 consistent 
with parametric convergence tests findings. However, from 1985 onwards a prominent right 
tail appears in both levels and growth rates suggesting that a group of states have detached 
from the others. Such snap shots of the distribution can be informative, but they hide 
important information, and in particular, how we get from one snapshot to another.  We can 
ask, for example, whether the outliers in the extreme right tails in plots of the growth 
distribution are the same states who persistently show higher growth, or whether over the 
longer term, the distribution is broadly symmetric with random states sometimes 
experiencing extraordinary growth.  The former would be consistent with the emergence of a 
spatial growth pole, the latter is not. 
A substantial literature has followed Quah’s lead in constructing Markov transition 
matrices which tabulate the probabilities of states moving among a finite number of intervals 
of the national income distribution and hence characterize the dynamic patterns of relative 
income movements.
14 To avoid problems associated with the naïve discretization of the 
income distribution (Bulli 2001), Quah (1997) proposes approximating a continuous 
distribution with the use of kernel density estimates.
15 We begin by constructing these for 
Mexico before and after the periods of trade liberalization. One advantage of both the 
transition matrices and the kernels is that they can be conditioned on state characteristics, 
including geographical location, to permit inference to permit inference about the  spatial  
dimensions of Mexico’s growth process.  We are interested in knowing if there is evidence of 
“spatial correlation” or “spatial dependence” where either income levels or growth rates are 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Fingleton, 1999; Rey, 2001; Lopez-Bazo et al, 1999; Puga, 1999 Employing these 
techniques for Mexico, Garcia-Verdu (2002) again finds no evidence of convergence in the post 1985 period. 
 
15 For the methodology behind estimating these kernels, readers are referred to the original paper (Quah 1997).   6
correlated by geographical location and whether groups of states have emerged as either 
positive or negative growth poles. 
The kernel analysis suggests visually possible patterns but is not well suited for 
statistical inference. We offer two sets of parametric tools to complement the visual analysis.  
First, to test whether two kernels differ between time periods, we offer a first approximation 
by testing for structural break in their discrete time analogues, transition matrices capturing 
the movement of states among five income quintiles. Each i,j entry of the matrix represents 
the probability of transiting from income state i to income state j in a five year period time.
16 
Following Bickenback and Boden (2001), we construct a Q statistic that tests for structural 
break between the subperiods, both at the individual interval level and for the matrices as a 
whole.  
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Where  j i p ˆ is the probability for a state to transit from income interval i to income interval j 
For the whole matrix, the test is simply ∑ =
i
i Q Q  
  Second, we introduce parametric measures of spatial dependence common in the 
spatial statistics literature but only recently applied to the study of economic growth.
 17 The 
first is Moran’s I statistic (the Global Moran; see Anselin 1988 and 1995) that is calculated 
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16 The asymptotically unbiased and normally distributed Maximum likelihood estimator of  ij p  is determined 
by  ∑ =
j ij ij ij n n p / ˆ , where  ij n  is the number of transitions from income class i to income class j over a 
period of time. 
17 See Rey (2001)   7
where n is the number of states; wij are the elements of a binary contiguity matrix W
18(nxn), 
taking the value 1 if states i and j share a common border and 0 if they do not; S is the sum of 
all the elements of W; and zi and zj are normalized
19 vectors of the log of per capita GDP of 
states i and j respectively. Positive (clustering of similar values) spatial dependence, whereas 
negative spatial correlation (clustering of different values). Statistical significance can be 
tested comparing the Moran’s I statistic with its theoretical mean and using a normal 
approximation. 
The global Moran may, however, could conceal patterns of co-movement in 
particular growth poles or convergence clubs.  These can be more easily detected by the 
“Local” Moran which calculates the Moran between an individual state and its spatial lag. 
Broadly speaking, in the same way that in time series econometrics a Durbin Watson test 
would capture co-movement of contemporaneous residuals with those of neighboring 
(lagged) time periods, the local Moran captures co-movement with neighboring states (its 













The local Moran can be interpreted as an indicator of spatial clustering, either of positive 
correlation or negative where the null hypothesis is no spatial dependence.  Local clusters are 
identified when the statistic is significantly different from zero.
20  In principal, the moran will 
also identifying the existence of comovements in states driven the presence or intensification 
of a gradient, for instance, from the US border. Further, in practice both the global and local 
Morans, the “neighborhood” may be defined in many ways: contiguity as defined above, but 
also, for instance, states lying a similar distance from the border.   
                                                 
18  Distance based matrices have been also employed giving similar results to the above presented (results 
available upon request).  
19 The zi = ln(GDPit /GDPt) denotes the logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product per capita of region i in period 
t, (GDPit), normalized by the sample mean of the same variable, GDPt (De la Fuente, 1997). 
20 Since the distribution of the statistic is usually unknown, Anselin (1995) suggests a Montecarlo-style method 
to generate it, consisting of the conditional randomization of the vector zj. That is, Moran statistics are 
calculated between state i and a large number of hypothetical “neighborhoods” constructed as random 
permutations of states drawn from the entire sample. Then, the true neighborhood Moran is compared against 
this distribution. 
   8
II. Data 
The Mexican National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI) 
tabulates official income data for Mexican 32 states GDP for 1970,1975,1980,1985,1988, 
and then annually for the period 1993-2002.   We follow Esquivel (1999), in making several 
corrections to this data.  First, most oil is pumped from the states of Tabasco and Campeche, 
but the attribution of oil revenues has changed without obvious cause over time.  Though the 
revenues are in fact allocated to all states via a federal sharing formula, in some years they 
were entirely attributed to Tabasco, and in others to Campeche.  We tried to correct for this, 
excluding the oil production as captured in the mineral production category of the state 
accounts, but still found the resulting growth series to be too erratic and exaggerated to be 
credible. We attribute this behavior to unresolved petroleum accounting issues since the 
remaining 30 non oil producing states behave more reasonably.
21  Though dropping these 
states clearly implies losing some of the spatial story, we find it preferable than 
contaminating the analysis with clearly unreliable series.  
Second, we also corrected populations figures for Chiapas and Oaxaca for years 1975, 
1980, 1985, 1988 as the 1980 census, when compared to other household census appears to 
have understated the state’s population  induced distortions in the GDP per capita.
22. 
Finally we have merged the state of Mexico with Mexico DF (Federal District), the 
capital. The rationale for this aggregation stems from the fact that the two states have long 
been part of a common industrial belt and there exist strong labor market linkages between 
them which may lead to an overstatement of the capital city’s per capita income.  This has 
led to reported population in the Mexico DF has remaining stable over the last 20 years while 
the population in the state of Mexico doubled. We run the analysis both with and without this 
aggregation (results available on request) and, while the fundamental story does not change, 
the more moderate growth behavior of the aggregated capital city we find more plausible and 
we report those results. 
                                                 
21 In fact, the state of Chiapas also produces some very modest amounts of oil and we subtracted this off from 
the state product series in  1975 and 1980.   
22 Population figures for years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1988 for Chiapas and Oaxaca were extrapolated using yearly 
population growth rates between 1970 and 1990. According to official figures, the mining production over GDP 
for Chiapas went from 7.5% in 1970 to 18% in 1975 up to 45% in 1980  and back to 7% in 1985. Clearly, years 
1975 and 1980 saw arbitrary assignments of oil production to Chiapas. We have corrected for this as to allow 
the ratio mining production over GDP to be 7.5% for the outlier years .      9
In sum, we have 29 states measured at 5 year intervals with 3 observations before the 
unilateral trade liberalization of 1985 and 3 after.
23 Table 1 and figures 1, 2a and 2b present 
that data and suggest that in the year 2000 regional differences in Mexico were vast: the GDP 
per capita of the poorest state, Oaxaca in the South was only  23% of the richest, Nuevo Leon 
in the North.  
 
III. Identifying Regions- covariance of income levels.  
We first ask whether there has been a major reordering of income levels across time 
and whether there has been correlation across groups of neighboring states that would 
constitute a region or that would suggest emerging gradients. Figures 3a and 3b plot the 
stochastic kernel as well as its contour plots for levels of per capita income for the 1970-85 
and 1985-2002 periods respectively. Both plots present state income relative to the country 
(“country-relative”) in time t on the Y axis and in time t+5 on the X axis.  The exact scale is 
used in both the pre and post-liberalization periods to facilitate inference about changes in the 
variance of the kernels.  The cross-hairs depict the country average in period t and in t+5. A 
couple points merit highlighting.  
First, if there were no movement at all among states, figures 3a and 3b would consist 
of a bisecting plane along the 45 degrees line shown.  The fact that states do shift relative 
position gives the kernel its volume. Slicing the volume parallel to the X axis reveals the 
distribution of states at each initial income five years later. Again, the advantage over the 
simple distribution plots is precisely that we can see changes of position that might be hidden 
by identical “snap shot” distributions.  Slicing parallel to the XY plane generates contour 
plots that show the relative probabilities of finding combinations of initial and final incomes.   
Second, significant income convergence would result in a rotation of the kernel 
toward the Y axis.  States with lower incomes in t would have higher relative incomes in t+5 
and vice versa. Divergence would lead to the reverse. 
For broad illustrative purposes, we introduce a state label at the position 
corresponding to the average value for each state.  This reference is only approximate since 
                                                 
23 When estimating the stochastic kernels and the transition matrices the years 1970, 1975,  1980, 1985, 1988, 
1993, 1998 and 2002 were used. We tried to keep the 5 year period  interval and at the same time avoid the 
1995 crisis which would have distorted our results.   10
the kernel is estimated three time points for the each state, but given the revealed persistence 
in relative income levels, they are informative.  
In fact, the most salient feature of both figures is the high persistence in the 
distribution. The probability mass is mainly concentrated in the diagonal of the plot showing 
that states did not significantly change their relative position. States located above the 45 
degree line saw a worsening of their relative positions over time and those below, an 
improvement.  
Though the persistence is clear, striking differences emerge between the pre- and 
post-85 kernels. The single peaked kernel in figure 3a has become a double or even triple 
peaked kernel suggesting the formation of convergence clubs over the post-85 period.   
Several forces are at play driving this evolution.  First, the bottom end of the distribution has 
become more compressed around 0.70 of the NAI (National Average Income) suggesting 
convergence toward the mean of the very poorest states. Second, above average states 
converged towards 1.3 of the NAI depopulating the center of the distribution. Finally, the 
states of Mexico, Nuevo Leon and Quintana Roo grew in income enough to have formed the 
last peak of the distribution with incomes above 1.7 NAI.  Another evolution, important to 
the finding of reduced beta convergence, is the fact that the poor states are clearly below the 
45 degree in the pre-liberalization period (2a) and on or above it in the post liberalization 
period (2b). This suggests reduced upward mobility of the poorest states in the post 
liberalization period.  
The discrete transition matrices confirm the continuous kernel story.  The persistence 
of income rankings is suggested by the high probabilities of remaining in the same interval 
tabulated along the main diagonal of the matrix (table 2).  The Q statistics do suggest that the 
pre- and post-1985 matrices are statistically different from each other at the 1% level and a 
large part of the reason appears to be changes in the dynamics of the poorer states suggested 
above. For instance, the probability of a state in interval 1 being found in that same interval 
in five years was 80% prior to 1985 and 93% after 1985.  States in quintile one and two were 
able to move upwards in the distribution with probability 7% and 5% respectively in the post 
1985 period against 20% and 29% in the previous time span suggesting that the increased 
sigma dispersion was partially caused by a stagnation of the poorer states.  
   11
The spatial dimension 
The question is then whether these convergence clubs translate into geographical 
“regions” as well.  Quah identified a similar “twin peaks” phenomenon in the kernel derived 
from a international cross section of per capita incomes and found it to be geographically 
driven- regional clusters of poor countries were getting poorer, the agglomerations of rich 
countries were getting richer. To use the kernel density plots to see if the same geographical 
patterns are emerging in Mexico, we regenerate the kernels replacing t+5 with the income of 
the state relative to the average income of its contiguous neighbors (“neighbor-relative”) in t.  
If the local and economy wide distributions of income are similar, that is, there are no 
clusters of states with similar incomes, we would find a concentration of probabilities along 
the main diagonal.  If, on the other hand, poor states are found with poor states and rich with 
rich, we should expect a rotation toward a vertical line at unity- a country-relative poor state 
will have the same income as its neighborhood.   
Figure 4a plots the spatially conditioned kernel density plots.  Several points merit 
note. First, geography does not determine destiny in Mexico to the degree that it appears to 
globally. Had the income clusters identified previously been totally determined by space, the 
three observed peaks would have been aligned along the vertical line at unity on the Y axis.  
However, the post 85 figure is fairly similar to the multiple peaked unconditional kernel of 
figure 3b and there is a large group of states (for example Zacatecas, Tlaxacala, Michoacan, 
Nuevo Leon) whose mass lies largely on the 45 degree line.  In the post -85 period the  
intermediate peak mainly consists of the northern states of Baja California Norte, Baja 
California Sur, Coahila and some successful central states such as Queretaro, Jalisco and, 
Aguascalientes (recently arrived) who show negative spatial correlation with neighbors. 
Quintana Roo and Mexico similarly constitute unusually high income areas,  the former 
joining Mexico and Nuevo Leon as especially rich states in the third cluster identified on 
figure 3b. Even post liberalization, the richest states could not be more independent spatially 
being, as they are, from three different regions of the country. We do not find Quah’s 
dramatic convergence clubs of rich and poor states.   
However, there is evidence of spatial dependence that would suggest regional effects.  
Prior to 1985 there is some rotation and compression of the upper mass that suggests that, 
particularly among northern states of Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua   12
and Tamaulipas there is a nascent convergence club in incomes.  However, as the border 
convergence club strengthened, the second line of states did not follow and hence we do not 
see a strong rotation of the “north”  broadly imagined toward the Y axis.  Sinaloa, Zacatecas, 
Durango and San Luis Potosi, all contiguous to the border states are relatively poor and lie 
largely on the 45 degree line.  There is also a group of poor southern states-- Oaxaca, 
Guerrero, Puebla and Chiapas and Vercruz--  found to be better off relative to their neighbors 
than they are relative to the country.  For example, Chiapas’ income is around 50% of the 
NAI but it is as rich as its neighbors (neighbor relative income is roughly unity).  These 
suggest that there are potentially aggregations that we might call “border” and “southern” 
regions to test for statistically. 
We are also interested in how the relationship to the US may affect states in a 
common way, even if not contiguous and we rerun the kernels with two additional definitions 
of neighborhood.  The first is based on the traditional geographical bands (“bands”) and is 
similar to the categories used by Hanson (2004): border, north non-border, center, south and 
Yucatan peninsula.
24  Second, we generate five categories based on distance by land to the 
US (“distance”). This is the specification that would most likely turn up evidence of a 
gradient as discussed by Hanson (1997).  Table 3 presents the states associated to each one of 
the neighborhoods for the two classifications.  
Figure 4b plots the US distance spatially conditioned contour plots
25 for the pre-and 
post-1985 using the bands-defined neighborhood. The strengthening of the border cluster 
becomes now particularly clear, since the new neighborhood of the border states does not 
include the relatively poorer second line states the way the contiguity matrix did.  This is 
especially clear in the second period where Baja California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and 
Coahuila are all piled on the vertical axis. Nuevo Leon remains separate to itself. Baja 
California Sur, by virtue of being bumped into the category of second row states, is now a 
high performer in its neighborhood.  
Second, there also seems to be a prominent clustering of the southern states of 
Oaxaca, Chiapas, Guerrero, Tlaxcala and Veracruz which becomes clearer in the second 
                                                 
24 Our categorization differs from that of Hanson by the inclusion of Aguascalientes as part of the central states 
and Puebla,Veracruz and Tlaxcala in the South. We, however, run the calculations using the exact Hanson 
classification with almost identical results.  
25 For the sake of space we just present the countour plots.    13
period as Oaxaca, Chiapas, Veracruz and Guerrero all move closer to the vertical line at 1 in 
the X axis. This causes an extension of the kernel toward the vertical that suggests 
convergence in income. Nevertheless, we still observe the presence of clear outliers and the 
alignment along the 45 degree line of the majority of the central states indicating a high 
degree of spatial independence overall.  
The kernel using distance to the US (not shown) is similar to that using the bands but 
the results are less clearly delineated.  This arises mainly because the south is split in two 
leaving the poor states of Chiapas and Oaxaca associated with the far richer states of Baja 
California Sur, Quintana Roo and Yucatan.  
In sum, the convergence clubs suggested in figures 3a and 3b partially map into 
border and southern regions of Mexico.  However, there are no other obvious other patterns 
of spatial association or clustering in the rest of the country. For any of our definitions of 
space, northern and central states mostly align along the 45 degree line showing little 
resemblance with their neighborhoods.   
Parametric measures of spatial dependence 
To establish whether the patterns suggested by the spatially conditioned kernels are 
statistically significant we turn to the Moran statistics. Figure 5 plots Moran’s I normal 
standardized values for the period 1970-2002 for the three different definitions of space 
considered, as well as the standard deviation of the GDP per capita for the same period as a 
measure of sigma convergence. What is immediately clear is that, viewing Mexico as a 
whole, spatial dependence in income levels has increased along with the sigma divergence 
after a period when both had fallen. The contiguity based neighborhood most closely track 
the standard deviation (with a correlation coefficient of 0.85), but the other neighborhoods 
arguably also follow a similar pattern, albeit, less clearly.  The relatively subtle indications of 
spatial dependence suggested in the kernels emerge as statistically significant in the Moran 
test, most notably, consistent with the kernels above, in the bands measure that most clearly 
captures the border and southern concentrations of wealth and poverty.  
The local Moran statistics identify whether particular groupings of states co-vary in a 
statistically significant way and largely confirm the observations from the kernels.  We 
present them in several different formats. First, the maps in figures 6a and 6b show the 
geographical distribution of significant local Morans based on contiguity for both the 10%   14
and 5% levels for the years 1970 and 2002, the endpoints of our sample. Second, the Moran 
scatterplots accompanying the maps graph the level of income of the state against that of its 
spatial lag for the same period as a way of illuminating the relationships captured by the 
statistics. A significant positive slope suggests that rich states are found among rich (quadrant 
1) and poor among poor (quadrant 3). Quadrants 2 and 4 represent cases where rich states are 
found among poor, or poor among rich respectively.  In fact this is a less efficient and 
comprehensive way of presenting the information in the kernels but one which allows a 
clearer view of the relative position of the states. Finally, tables 4 offer more detail still by 
showing significance levels and signs of the Moran statistics at 5 year intervals across the 
sample for all three definitions of neighborhood.  Three findings emerge. 
First, in the early period, we confirm a cluster of poor states around Oaxaca, 
Guerrero, Puebla, Chiapas and Guerrero corresponding to the traditional “southern states.” 
These appear strongly in the maps and in quadrant 3 of the scatter plots, and table 4 suggests 
that this relationship has been getting stronger across time for all definitions of 
neighborhood.  
Second, using the bands or the distance measure, table 4 confirms that the border 
states considered as a block clearly stand as a pole of high income levels that has become 
stronger with time.  However, the lack of any significance using the connectivity measure 
confirms that the income levels of the next row of states are not correlated with those of the 
border and hence it may not be so useful to talk about the “north” more generally.  Baja 
California Norte and Baja California Sur, and Sonora appear in the quadrant 1 of the scatter 
plots as well-off states in better-off neighborhoods, and hence might be seen as a well-off 
convergence cluster located in the north of the country along the US border. However, these 
correlations seem to slowly disappear by the beginning of the 1990’s and the North, as a 
spatial unity encompassing more than just the border states disappears. The higher income of 
the frontline states has not spilled over much to the next line.  
In the center we find little in the way of convergence clusters. Most of the Central 
states are located in quadrants 2 and 4 almost suggesting a downward sloping line (if we 
abstract from the outliers) and a tendency for rich states to be found among poor and vice 
versa. The greater variance in income per capita of this region (see table 1) underlies the 
finding of a lack of spatial dependency: poor states such as Zacatecas, Michoacan, Hidalgo,   15
Nayarit and rich states such as Mexico/DF, Aguascalientes and Queretao share the same 
neighborhood. Consequently, we do not find any significant Moran statistics in this area for 
any of the periods, with the exception on the negative values associated with Jalisco and 
Mexico/DF indicating that these two states are well-off states surrounded by poor neighbors. 
At this point these results suggest that the Mexico/DF agglomeration has not pulled along its 
neighbors.  
Therefore, as regions with some degree of commonality of levels of income, the 
South exists, the North seems to be restricted to those states directly on the US border and 
there has not ever been a Center.  The latter finding is perhaps unexpected if their 
performance were heavily influenced by the existence a north-south and Mexico City   
gradients.  Their interaction might give rise to more complex income relations than, for 
instance, we see on the border, but it is not obvious why we should find an almost random 
distribution of rich and poor states.   
 
IV. Any link between geographical evolution and divergence? 
The next question is whether thinking of these grouping as regions helps us to explain 
the pattern of economic divergence that we see. Clearly, the post liberalization divergence is 
driven by many forces and disentangling them is complex.  For instance, both Aguascalientes 
and Quintana Roo pulled away strongly from their local neighborhood while Mexico 
appeared to become less of an outlier in its neighborhood. All things equal, these would lead 
to greater divergence and convergence respectively.  To get a more systematic, although still 
very imperfect idea of how much of the increased dispersion has a geographical component, 
we begin by following Shorrocks and Wan (2005) in applying techniques developed for 
subgroup decomposition of inequality.  This simply involves partitioning the sample in a set 
of geographical regions and then calculating the two components of aggregate inequality; a 
weighted average of regional inequality (within-group component) and the between group 
component term which captures the inequality due to variations in average incomes across 
regions. We proceed we the decomposition of the mean logarithmic deviation: 
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where N in our case is the number of states which are partitioned in M mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive groups (regions).   
  Figure 6 plots the evolution of overall inequality as well as the between group and 
within group components together with the ration of between group to total inequality (B/T). 
Several points merit attention. First, the mean logarithmic deviation basically retrieves the 
same pattern of evolution of inequality than the standard deviation in figure 5.  Secondly, 
most of the increase in inequality (94%) between 1985-2002 occurs in the period 1985-1993, 
prior to NAFTA. Looking closely at this period, both the between group and the within group 
component grew, suggesting that although 60% of the increase in dispersion was inter 
regional, much of it occurred within regions. Third, the 1994-2002 period was relatively 
stable in terms of inequality. However differences across regions increase in a time where 
within group inequality was decreasing. Overall, the between group inequality can explain 
72% of the increase in total inequality from 1985 until 2002 with much of this is explained 
by the regional level movements between border, south and “other” split: If we divide the 
sample in three regions (border, south and rest) between groups inequality explains 66%.   
 
Growth 
  Additional information on what may be driving dispersion can be gleaned by looking 
at the evolution of the spatial distribution of growth rates. We can conduct an exactly 
analogous, although somewhat simplified, set of exercises to identify regional patterns of co-
movement in growth (see annex for definitions).  In the kernel plots in figure 7a alignment 
along the axis suggests persistence in growth rates: a fast growing state today will be fast 
tomorrow.
 26  Two things emerge strikingly from the pre- and post- 1985 kernels.  First, the 
mass of probabilities seems to occupy the four quadrants more or less equally:  A state that 
grows fast today is as likely to grow slow tomorrow as to grow fast again. This is not so 
surprising when we remember that in the pre-liberalization period many of the northern states 
had alternating high and low growth rates due to the 1982 debt crisis which hit the most 
dynamic states hardest and something similar seems to have occurred at the end of the 1990s.  
The distribution shows greater variance in the post liberalization period, but still does not 
show strong persistence in growth rates.  Conditioning on the contiguous neighborhood 
                                                 
26 In this case we did not reference the states generating the mass of probabilities as the growth rates did not 
show any persistency over time so the period averages would be meaningless.    17
(figure 7b) suggests little in the way of growth convergence clusters.  The central mass is 
fairly tightly aligned along the 45 degree reference in both the pre- and post- 85 periods.  We 
rerun the kernels with the other two neighborhood measures and again find no obvious visual 
regularities. 
The overall Moran I using connectivity and the regional bands suggests a degree of 
spatial dependence in the pre-liberalization period, but over time this dependence has 
decayed-there has been a de-spatialization of growth rates in Mexico. Using the distance 
from the US neighborhood measure, however, we see no spatial dependence until the 1994-
2002 period, coinciding with NAFTA.  
Since this is the only evidence of spatial dependence in the post-reform period, the 
Moran scatterplots are calculated using this measure of neighborhood. The local Morans 
(table 6, figures 10a and b) at first glance seem to suggest that spatial growth patterns are 
dominated by the north/south dichotomy. In the 1970-85, all measures suggest positive co 
movements among border states with their neighbors in the third quadrant of low growth 
states among low growth states, but no other clusters. This border cluster disappears in the 
post-liberalization period, but Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca Tlaxcala and Veracruz replicate its  
behavior in the post-trade liberalization period: low growth states among a group of low 
growth states.  Additionally, the connectivity based Moran suggests that Mexico/DF 
aggregation significantly under performs in the early period in a time when its neighborhood 
was doing much better.  These findings are consistent with the income convergence observed 
before liberalization and the divergence after. What is striking, however, is that we do not 
observe a northern pole of growth in the post- liberalization period as a whole with any of 
our definitions of space.  Instead, there is mild evidence of a central cluster of high growth in 
the states of Aguascalientes and Guanajuato. 
Dividing the post-85 period into post-GATT and post-NAFTA sub-period yields 
consistent but stronger results (figures 9a and b).  During the first sub-period, the only major 
development is the extremely poor performance of southern states, especially, Chiapas, 
Veracruz, and Tlaxacla.  Although some southern states such as Puebla were growing above 
average, other poor Central and Northern states like Hidalgo Nayarit and Zacatecas 
performed below average while rich states such as Aguascalientes, Quintana Roo and 
Chihuahua grew steadily. These tendencies are consistent with increased income dispersion   18
over this period but make clear geographical generalization difficult.  Neither the north as a 
whole, nor the border  constitute a pole of commoving states driving divergence. 
The second sub-period is also characterized by increasing but less dramatic 
divergence.  However, again the border states do not seem to constitute a growth pole. Nuevo 
Leon, Chihuaha and Coahuila perform above average and Coahuila and Nuevo Leon do show 
local Moran’s that might suggest a mini-growth pole. But Baja California grows at below 
average rates and  Sonora and Tamaulipas, at average rates. Clearly, this performance by rich 
states while poor states grow below average will contribute to divergence.  But it is not the 
case that the border states as a group grew in a common way or dramatically outperformed 
the rest of the country.  
  A clear growth pole does emerge among in second line and central states of 
Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Queretaro and Zacatecas. Since these states are roughly 
equidistant from the border, this, and not the comovement of the border states, is what drives 
the significant distance-based Moran I in this period.  Since most are relatively rich states, 
their success suggests a potentially important dynamic outside of the North South dynamic 
discussed above.  The South as a whole still underperforms, especially Guerrero, although 
the southern block seems less coordinated than when the entire post 1985 period is taken.   
In sum, it seems difficult to argue that a special reaction to NAFTA of the states 
closest to the border was the driving force behind divergence.  The consistently poor 
performance of the south which does form a regional cluster, does emerge as a central 
element in the story.   
 
V. Conclusions. 
This paper employs established techniques from the spatial statistics literature to 
investigate how the post 1985 trade reforms affected spatial patterns of economic activity.  
Looking at levels of per capita state income, we find that very clearly a south exists, but the 
north seems to be restricted to those states directly on the US border, and there has never 
been a center.  The latter finding is perhaps unexpected if the performance of the center states 
were heavily influenced by the confluence of a north-south and a Mexico City gradient.  Our 
guess is that previous parametric findings of a gradient were driven by the imposition of a   19
linear relationship with distance from the border that identified off the high north and south 
incomes but obscured the randomness in between.  Their interaction might give rise to more 
complex income relations than, for instance, we see on the border, but it is not obvious why 
we should find an almost random distribution of rich and poor states.  That said, the Thiel 
decompositions suggest that reversal of the pre-1985 convergence seems to no small part 
driven by the divergent paths of these two regions.  
However, the spatial distribution of growth suggest some additional complexity.  Post 
liberalization period is not especially tied to closeness to the US border, and, consistent with 
our reading of the non-spatial parametric literature, do not offer strong support to an 
increasing gradient from North to South.  The substantial divergence occurring in the 1985-
93 period shows no traces of spatial dependence and seems unrelated to the consolidation of 
a faster growing northern block of even border states- only the south shows co-varying 
growth rates across this period. The sustained underperformance of the South, dating from 
before NAFTA, the treaty most affecting the local agricultural industries, and the superior 
performance of an emerging convergence club in the center of the country are also likely 
candidates for explaining much of the divergence occurring in the final period.  
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Figures  9 a: 
 
Kernels generated using three growth spans of  5 years each before and after 1985:  
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Table 1. Mexican 2002 GDP per capita by state, constant pesos 1993 
 










BC  Baja California   North  2,706  47,091  17,405  19,730  0.20 
CO Coahuila    2,444  49,651  20,314     
CU Chihuahua      3,252  64,461  19,823     
NL Nuevo  León    4,046  105,270  26,019    
SO Sonora      2,370  39,729  16,763     
TA  Tamaulipas     2,990  45,124  15,094       
BCs  Baja California Sur  Central-North  464  8,330  17,968  11,333  0.28 
DU Durango      1,536  18,953  12,341     
SL  San Luis Potosí     2,373  25,656  10,811     
SI Sinaloa    2,697  30,628  11,356     
ZA Zacatecas      1,410  12,534  8,887       
AG Aguascalientes    Central  995  18,386 18,470 16,507  0.33 
CL Colima    569  8,119  14,263     
GU Guanajuato    4,942  55,583  11,246    
HI Hidalgo      2,330  20,364  8,741     
JA Jalisco    6,639  95,731  14,420     
MX Mexico  and  DF    22,796  482,133  21,150     
MI Michoacán    4,181  33,871  8,101     
MO Morelos    1,659  20,537  12,382     
NA Nayarit    977  8,333  8,527     
QU  Querétaro     1,515  26,224  17,313       
CH  Chiapas    South  4,232  26,307 6,216 7,761  0.18 
GE Guerrero    3,221  23,979  7,445     
OA Oaxaca      3,642  21,812  5,989     
PU Puebla      5,362  51,219  9,552     
TL Tlaxcala    1,022  8,011  7,841     
VC  Veracruz      7,225  60,395  8,359       
QI Quintana  Roo 
Yucatan 
Peninsula    976  20,874 21,383 15,117  0.42 
YU  Yucatán     1,737  20,142  11,596       
CA Campeche   
Not in the 
sample  737 16,789  22,785     
DF Distrito  Federal    8,813  327,009 37,107     
MX México    13,984 155,124  11,093     
TB Tabasco      1,996  17,050  8,542     
   Total     103,040 1,483,284  14,395      0.40   24
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Figure 4a: Kernel Density Plots, Levels, Conditional on Spatial Lag (Neighbors): 1970-1985 vs 1985-2002 
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Figure 4b: Kernel Density Plots, Levels, Conditional on Spatial Lag (US Distance):1970-1985 vs 1985-2002 
 
1970-1985 1985-2002 


















































 VC   YU 
 ZC 
 



















































   27
Table 2. Transition Matrices 1970-2002 
 
Transition Matrix 1970-2002      
Number   1  2  3  4  5 
35 1  0.86  0.14 0.00  0.00  0.00 
35 2  0.17  0.69  0.14 0.00 0.00 
35 3  0.00  0.14  0.77  0.09 0.00 
35 4  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.80  0.17 
34 5  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.18  0.82 
            
Transition Matrix 1970-1985     
   1  2  3  4  5 
20 1  0.80  0.20 0.00  0.00  0.00 
14 2  0.07  0.64  0.29 0.00 0.00 
21 3  0.00  0.14  0.76  0.10 0.00 
13 4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.92  0.08 
19 5  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.21  0.79 
            
Transtion Matrix 1985-2002     
   1  2  3  4  5 
15 1  0.93  0.07 0.00  0.00  0.00 
21 2  0.28  0.66  0.05 0.00 0.00 
14 3  0.00  0.14  0.79  0.07 0.00 
22 4  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.63  0.27 
15 5  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.93 
 
         d.f  Q-statistic  P-value 
              
Ho:  1 | ˆ ˆ ) 85 1970 ( ) 02 1985 ( = = − − i p p j i j i   1 5.71  0.02 
Ho:  2 | ˆ ˆ ) 85 1970 ( ) 02 1985 ( = = − − i p p j i j i   2 18.92  0.00 
Ho:  3 | ˆ ˆ ) 85 1970 ( ) 02 1985 ( = = − − i p p j i j i   2 0.18  0.91 
Ho:  4 | ˆ ˆ ) 85 1970 ( ) 02 1985 ( = = − − i p p j i j i   2 4.68  0.09 
Ho:  5 | ˆ ˆ ) 85 1970 ( ) 02 1985 ( = = − − i p p j i j i   1 6.31  0.01 
Ho:  i p p j i j i ∀ = − − ) 85 1970 ( ) 02 1985 ( ˆ ˆ   8 35.83  0.00 
 
Table 3. State Classification According to Distance to the US Border 
 
  Bands    Distance to US border 
Border  BC CO CU NL SO TM  0 km-351 km  BC, CO, CU, NL, SO, TM 
North  BC’s, DU, SI, SL, ZA  351 km-870 km  AG, GU, DU, QU, SL, ZA 
Centre  NA, GU, CL, HI, JA, MX, MI, 
MO, AG, QU 
870 km-1130  HI, JA, MX, MI, MO, SI 
South   GE, OA, CH, PU, TL, VC  1130 km-1416 km  GE, CL, NA, PU, TL, VC 
Yucatan  YU,QI  >1416 km  BC’s CH OA QI YU    28
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Note: C=contiguity matrix, B=Bands, D=Distance from the US  29
Figure 6a: Significance of Local Moran for GDP per capita 1970: Map and Moran Scatterplot 
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Figure 6b: Significance of Local Moran for GDP per capita 2002: Map and Moran Scatterplot 
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Table 4: Local Moran: Levels 
 
CBDCBDCBDCBDCBDCBD
B a j a  C a l i f o r n i a  N o r t e + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ + + ++ + + ++ +
Coahuila De Zaragoza ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Chihuahua + + + +      + ++ ++ ++ ++
Nuevo Leon ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Sonora ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Tamaulipas ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Baja California Sur ++ - +





Colima -- -- -
Guanajuato
Hidalgo
Jalisco - - -- --





Chiapas ++ + ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ ++
Guerrero ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ +
Oaxaca ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Puebla ++ ++ ++ + ++ + ++ + + ++ +
Tlaxcala ++ ++ ++ + ++ + ++ +
Veracruz-Llave + ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++
Yucatan - - - -
Quintana Roo
1970 1975 1980 1985 1993 2002
 
























Table 5: Between and Within Group Inequality 
 
Year Eo(y)  Between  Within  B/Eo(y) 
1970 0.078  0.038 0.040  49% 
1985 0.045  0.021 0.024  47% 
1993 0.073  0.038 0.035  52% 
2002 0.075  0.043 0.032  57% 
        
Contribution to the change in inequality.    
        
All Regions  Between  Within   
       
1970-1985 50%  50%   
1985-2002 72%  28%   
        
Border-South-Rest     
        
1970-1985 50%  50%   
1985-2002 66%  34%     
   1
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Figure 9b Kernel Density Plots,  Growth, Conditional on Spatial Lag (Neighbors):1970-1985 vs 1985-2002 
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Figure 9a: Kernel Density Plots, Growth, Unconditioned: 1970-1985 vs 1985-2002 
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tTable 6: Local Moran: Growth Rates 
 
CBDCBDCBDCBD
Baja California Norte ++ ++  
Coahuila De Zaragoza + +   +
Chihuahua
Nuevo Leon ++ ++ + + +
Sonora ++ ++ ++
Tamaulipas ++ ++
Baja California Sur + -
Durango ++





Guanajuato + ++ ++
Hidalgo
Jalisco
Mexico and DF --
Michoacan de Ocampo
Morelos  - +
Nayarit - ++ +  
Queretaro de Arteaga ++
C h i a p a s + ++ + + +- -
Guerrero ++ + ++ + +
Oaxaca ++ + ++
Puebla + -
T l a x c a l a + + ++ + + ++
V e r a c r u z - L l a v e - - - + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ +
Yucatan +
Quintana Roo
1994-2002 1970-85 1985-2002 1985-1993
 
Note: C=contiguity matrix, B=Bands, D=Distance from the US 
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Figure 10b: Significance of Local Moran for Growth of GDP per capita 1985-2002: Map and Moran Scatterplot 
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Figure 10a: Significance of Local Moran for Growth of GDP per capita 1970-1985: Map and Moran Scatterplot 
Significance level 
5%                10% 
Significance level 
5%                10%   2
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Figure 11b: Significance of Local Moran for Growth of GDP per capita 1994-2002: Map and Moran Scatterplot 
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Figure 11a: Significance of Local Moran for Growth of GDP per capita 1985-1993: Map and Moran Scatterplot 
Significance level 
5%                10% 
Significance level 
5%                10% 